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pAbstract
The landscape of post-colonial development is marked by deepening dependency
of the developing states on the core states consisted mainly of western developed
countries. The continuous widening of the north–south divide is not surprising
given that the discourse on international relations has been dominated by western
ideologies of realism, liberalism and constructivism, resulting in an insufficient
attempt to examine international relations from a non-Westphalian perspective.
Through the implementation of the Washington Consensus, developing countries
are being forced to follow the development model of liberal democracy designed
by the West, for the benefit of the West. This paper attempts to investigate an
alternative approach from a Chinese historical structural perspective. By highlighting
the key tenets of Confucianism, this paper aims to contribute towards a non-Western
international relations discourse that is based on moral values. Attempts by China to
provide assistance to the “poor south” are marred by accusations of neo-colonialism.
In order to fulfil its great power responsibility, China needs to incorporate these
Confucian values into its Beijing Consensus so that the global south can abandon
their dependency on the West and truly set the stage for south-south cooperation.
Keywords: Dependency; Confucianism; South-south cooperation; Beijing Consensus;
China external relations; BandungIntroduction
The concept of sovereign state emerged from Europe after the end of the Thirty Years’
War and the Westphalian Peace in 1648. The key tenets of a post-Westphalian order are
territorial integrity, mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty, and the equality among
states (Schmidt 2011). States become a unit of analysis in international relations. Yet, the
boundaries of states have been breached with the rapid development of capitalism that
drove European states to imperialism and ultimately colonialism (Lenin 1916 [1982]).
After the Second World War, although colonialism has lost its appeal in shapes and
forms, replaced it is a new wave of neo-colonialism based on a system of unequal
exchange that leads to the underdeveloped peripheral countries continue to serve the rich
core industrialised countries. Early dependency theorists asked why developing countries
remained underdeveloped, and exploitation was among their common conclusions (Dos
Santos 1971; Frank 1967; Amin 1974). Whilst dependency theory shares the same critical
epistemological root as Marxism, it is nonetheless different in that Marxism examines
exploitation from the micro-economic process of production, whereas dependency school2015 Yue; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
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Second World War, the global economic order is structured under international
organisations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), both
legacies of the US directed Bretton Woods conference. Far from setting a level playing
field for the underdeveloped countries, their policies forced the domestically weak
countries to carry out liberal reforms such as privatisations, lowering tariffs, abandoning
foreign exchange controls. These countries were forced to play “casino capitalism” under
the rules of the West, effectively serving themselves on a plate for the developed countries
to consume (Strange 1997). The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 is a case in point when the
central banks of Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines were attacked by Western-led
hedge funds.
This paper begins by asking how dependency is being constructed under the Western
system and the mechanisms through which peripheral states are being exploited. At the
same time, answers need to be found why the affected countries cannot reject the
approach from the West? This leads us to examine the early resistance signified by the
Bandung Conference in 1955, which was attended by twenty-nine countries from Africa
and Asia. Although the conference made many headlines, the occasion proved to be more
rhetoric than realistic as it failed arrest the continuous exploitation by the West.
Globalisation expands the reach of capitalism to even the communist and socialist states. If
the development of developing countries is structurally tied to the Western economic
system, then these countries will remain within the shadow of western capitalism. To break
away from the dependency orbit, a new south-south dialogue needs to be constructed.
This paper posits that the failure of the Bandung initiative was boiled down to the lack of
leadership. In 1955, there was no participant from the global south who could lead a
movement to break from the Western dependence. Yet, with the rapid transformation of
China’s economic fortunes, China has the potential to be the flag carrier for a new Bandung
initiative. Based on the foundations laid down in the Bandung Conference, this paper argues
that the virtues prescribed by Confucianism hold the key to unify the South, to set a path
for south-south cooperation that leads to genuine development of these countries.
Theoretical argument: dependency as a result of Western ideology domination
Following the Age of Enlightenment in the 18th Century, the agrarian society was rapidly
being transformed by scientific discoveries which propelled a rapid phase of industrialisation
across Europe. Specialisation spurred increase in productivity. To facilitate industrialisation
and specialisation, segregation of ownership and stewardship advanced the development of
capitalism. Early day capitalism was mainly geared towards the production of consumable
goods. European societies were transformed from feudalism to political economies. The
increase in productivity, while brought wealth to the industrialists, also presented a big
problem to the governments, they needed a bigger market to fill the increased capacity.
To secure more markets, they ventured abroad, driven by imperialism in ideology but
implementing colonialism in practice. Larrain (1989: 3–17) described the period 1700–
1860 as the era of “competitive capitalism”, and was followed by the “age of imperialism”
in 1860–1945, developed to the stage of “late capitalism” in 1945–1966, and degenerated
into “deceleration and crisis” in 1966–1980. Throughout the transitions from 1700 to
1980, Larrain saw the expansion of capitalism was the culprit for dependency. In his
seminal book Capital, Marx (1818–1883) believed free capitalism would eventually create
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could extend beyond national borders, development prompted by capitalism would become
“capitalist imperialism” at the highest stage of capitalism (Lenin, 1916:83). According to
Lenin, as long as development is driven by capitalism, imperialism is inevitable.
Prebisch (1959) confirmed Lenin’s concerns in the 1950’s study carried out by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Prebisch found that
whilst the industrialized countries got richer, the underdeveloped countries in Latin
America got poorer even though trade between them increased. His offered a very simple
explanation: poor countries exported their primary resources to the rich countries, the
rich countries used these raw materials to manufacture consumer goods and then sell
back to the poor countries at value-added costs. Consequently, the poor countries would
always end up with trade deficits. Prebisch has lifted the curtain of the debate on core and
peripheral states, and set the stage for dependency to be played out behind a neo-
imperialism and neo-colonialism landscape.
After the ELCA study, dependency theorists like Frank (1972), Cardoso and Faletto
(1979), continued with Prebisch’s inquiry on the unfair relationship between core and
peripheral states. Wallerstein (1974) expanded on the duality of core-peripheral relationship
by adding semi-peripheral states in his world system theory. Whilst dependency theory
attracted attention in the critical discourse, it was neo-liberalism that was running the
show in the international arena. Friedman (1962), together with his Chicago School of
economics, advocated monetarism and overturned the Keynesian doctrines. US President
Ronald Reagan and UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were among his disciples and
helped to advance global trade on western terms and structures. Although Amin (1974)
and Emmanuel (1972) continued the dependency debate with their unequal exchange
theories, there is no doubt that in reality, the discourse on dependency stayed within the
academic circle and never quite made it to the policy level, because like economic
dependency, the moral high ground of representations is likewise being occupied by the
dominant states. As Escobar (1995: 5) applying Foucault’s work on the dynamics of
discourse and power in the representation of social reality pointedly claimed, the
“colonization of reality” makes possible “a certain order of discourse produces permissible
modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even making others impossible”.
Consequently, the developed states never acknowledge the fact that dependency is a
problem. The discourse on dependency among western politicians is relatively muted. Neo-
liberalist ideals are still being implemented as foreign policies in the form of Washington
Consensus well beyond the imperial and colonial eras and into the neo-colonial 21st Century.
After the end of the Cold War, the US has become the undisputed global hegemon.
Fukuyama (1992) was able to declare the End of History with liberal democracy as the
ultimate form of governance. Ideologically claiming the moral high ground, the West set
the structure of the global financial system, which is also regulated by the West, to
reinforce the doctrine of liberal democracy at the expense of creating dependency in the
developing world. Consequently, aid from the US is made conditional upon the recipients
introducing liberal democratic reforms under the doctrine of the Washington Consensus.
Yet, following the 911 terrorist attack on American soils in 2001, former US President
George Bush had to ask “Why do they hate us?” a The US sub-prime crisis ultimately
triggered the question of whether liberal democracy should be the universal norm of
governances.
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Against the background of the Cold War, many Asian and African countries were caught
between a polarised world that was divided by ideology, development was marginalised.
Calling for economic and cultural cooperation, and preventing Western colonialism,
twenty-nine countries congregated in Bandung, Indonesia, on April 18–24 1955 to chart
the path for coexistence. The seven-day conference ended with the issue of a 10-point
joint declaration, which called for the respect for fundamental human rights; respect for
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations; recognition of equality of races and
nations irrespective of size; non-intervention of another country’s internal affairs; respect
the right of each country to defend itself; abstention from collective defence to serve the
interests of big powers and abstention from pressuring other countries; refraining from
acts or threats of aggression against other countries; settlement of disputes through
peaceful means; promotion of mutual interests and cooperation; and respect for justice
and international obligations b.
However, soon after the conference, the two Vietnams were at war with each other in
1959; the Sino-India war broke out in; and Indonesia, the host of the conference, declared a
policy of confrontation against the newly-formed Malaysia in 1964 (Finnane 2010: 1).
Therefore, whilst the Bandung Conference can be seen as an ambitious project to galvanise
the global south, in reality, the coalition was very fragile, the joint declaration of peaceful-
co-existence was mere political rhetoric.
Indeed, the conference came to an immediate deadlock on the first day after human
rights was tabled for discussion (Burke 2010: 33–34). The successful conclusion of the
conference was the result of the masterful diplomatic skill of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai,
who managed to present China’s stance in a conciliatory tone (Burke 2010; Finnane 2010;
Mackie 2005; Roy 1998). If the success of the Bandung conference was boiled down to the
charisma of one man, the failure to implement the joint declaration could also be
attributed to the absence of leadership.
The death of Zhou Enlai in January 1976 and Mao Zedong eight months later brought
an end to an era that was saddled with decolonialisation and Cold War confrontations. In
its wake was the rapid transformation of China’s fortunes under reforms introduced by
Deng Xiaoping. If the failure of Bandung was attributed to a lack of leadership, could the
rise of China present a second coming of Bandung to unite the global south and free them
from western dependency?The rise of China and the missed chances
China experienced rapid economic growth after the introduction of open-door policy in
the post-Mao era. In the three decades that followed, China has propelled itself to become
the second largest economy in the world with nominal GDP stood at $8.2 trillion in 2012
(US $16.2 trillion; Japan $6.0 trillion); for the same year, it ranked first in export at $2.0
trillion (US $1.6 trillion; Germany $1.5 trillion); second in import at $1.8 trillion (US $2.4
trillion; Germany $1.3 trillion); it possessed the highest foreign reserve in the world at
$3.2 trillion, almost three times the second largest reserve country Japan at $1.2 trillionc.
Amidst the rise in China’s status comes the Chinese threat, the country has the most
number of active troops and it possesses nuclear weapons d. The history of China is
scarred by imperial invasions in the last two centuries. Thus, the question of whether
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giving the wrong impression that China is no different from Western powers when they
reached for global hegemony, China subsequently changed its claim on peaceful rise to
peaceful development.
China was very pragmatic in its initial development. Deng’s thinking was heavily
influenced by sixth century BC philosopher Lao Tzu, who started Taoism (Shen 2010:
5–6). Taoism emphasizes on the virtues of staying in a low profile and be patient. These
Taoist principles laid the undertone of China’s foreign policy under Deng. Subsequent
leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao fine-tuned Deng’s policy in order to meet a changing
world order, but they deviated from Deng’s Taoist diplomacy and missed the opportunity
to position China as the flag-carrier of south-south cooperation.
After the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, China urgently needed to repair her
battered image, thus prompted Deng to lay down his famous foreign policy dictums of
lengjing guancha (冷靜觀察; calmly observe the situations); shouzhu zhendi (穩住陣地;
secure footing); chenzhou yingfu (沉著應付; cope changes with calm, vigilance and confi-
dence); taoguang yanghui (韜光養晦; conceal capacities and bide time); shanyu shouzhou
(善于守拙; skillfully keep a low profile); and juebu dangtou (决不當頭; avoid sticking
head out) (Gong et al. 1998). However, after securing a sound economic base, Deng’s
successor Jiang Zemin introduced the concept of “great power strategy” by adding grasping
opportunities and making the best use of a situation to Deng’s initial ideas. Jiang set China
on a more adventurous course that drove towards great power status. When Jiang
transferred leadership to Hu Jintao in 2003, China was a more confident nation enjoying
resounding economic success and international praise on its handling of the Asia financial
crisis by not devaluing the renminbi. Hu began to work on “peaceful development”,
“harmonious international order” and “global responsibility”. Under the Hu doctrine, four
interrelated initiatives were introduced. First, China endeavored to maintain good
relationship with the US and other international powers. Second, as the global order began
to revolve around a G2 scenario, China seeked to actively promote diplomacy with her
neighbours to create a buffer against US pressure. Third, China accelerated her involvement
in regional and international organizations to promote economic development and security.
Finally, in order to project a positive image abroad, China began to undertake greater
international responsibilities by actively participating in United Nations peace missions.
If China were to become the flag-carrier of a new south-south cooperation initiative,
several questions need to be addressed. First, has China set up a new model of development
without having to repeat colonialism carried out by the old imperialists? Secondly, has
China illuminated a new way for great power to emerge, that there should be no confrontation,
and no Cold War mentality? Finally, has China exhibited a new model of social control
through promoting a harmonious society?Has China established a new model of development?
In the 19th Century many western powers colonized countries in Latin America, Africa and
Asia in order to secure raw materials and open up new markets. Many neighbors of China
in Asia have colonial past, and hence they are rightly concerned about China’s rise.
However, during China’s modernization, China has not taken any colony. China modernized
through reforming state-owned enterprises and by attracting foreign investments. Overseas
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modernization process. Through comparative advantage, entirely in accordance with the
Heckscher and Ohlin theory that a country should concentrate on its factors of endowment,
China specialized in labor-intensive manufacturing goods and export to the US and Europe,
while imports capital from them in return. New markets have been opened because of cost
advantage, and not by forceful colonization. In securing raw materials, China buys from
Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. In Africa, China helps countries to build roads,
hospitals and schools, provides cheap loans, and write off debts, in order to secure resource
concessions. Providing development aid to under-developed countries with no pre-
condition, synonymized under Beijing Consensus, forms a strong contrast to the Washington
Consensus, which requires the recipient country to introduce democracy and market
reforms. By adopting multilateral diplomacy and through tightening relationships with
African countries and ASEAN neighbors, China has become a status quo power alongside
the US.
However, not everyone agrees with China’s practice in Africa. In 2011, US Foreign
Secretary Hilary Clinton pointedly accused China practicing neo-colonialism in the
African continent e. These practices allowed authoritarian regimes to take hold, corruptions
to go unchecked, democratic development on the reverse. Therefore, China’s new model
of development equates to just buying up crony states. However, China is doing much
more than just buying resources and selling cheap goods to Africa. In 2004, China
provided US$2 billion in loan and aid to Angola that allowed the country to reject a
hugely unpopular IMF rescue package that involved opening up the market and abolishing
local trade unions f. In Sudan between 1997 and 2007, China had granted the country over
US$550 million in interest-free loans; in 2003 China provided US$930 million for the
construction of the Merower Dam to help to improve the local irrigation and provide
hydro-electricity; and in 2008 China supplied further US$2.8 million in humanitarian aid
for the country g. In 2009, China provided the bulk of the US$650 million required to
build the Djibloho Hydropower Project in Equatorial Guinea h. By 2009, China had
financed a total of 884 projects in Africa, including 142 agricultural projects, 71 schools,
54 hospitals, 53 sports complexes, and 62 conference centers i. While there may be other
contributing factors, Chinese involvement in Africa coincided with an overall improve-
ment in social conditions in many African countries. Annual GDP growth in Sub-Saharan
African averaged 5.5% per annum during the decade 2000 to 2010 (Figure 1). Through
building more schools, the adult literacy rate has improved from 47% in 2000 to 66% in
2010; youth (age 15–24) literacy rate jumped from 56% to 78% in the same period
(Table 1). Infant mortality rate in West and Central Africa dropped from 196 per 1,000
live birth to 143 in the twenty years between 1990 and 2010; Eastern and Southern Africa
likewise recorded a drop from 156 to 98 during the same period (Figure 2).Has China illuminated a new way for a great power to emerge?
Through multilateral diplomacy, China has increased its political space in the international
arena. In the Korean peninsula, China played an active role in bringing about the Six Party
Talks to ease the tension caused by North Korea’s provocative actions. With the exception
of India, China has settled all land territorial disputes. It has created the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization to foster security cooperation in Central Asia. With its Asian
Figure 1 Comparative GDP Growth: Developed Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Advanced Countries.
Source: IMF.
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signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003 and issued Joint Declaration on
Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in 2003. Even the accidental bombing of its
embassy in Belgrade by US-led NATO forces was handled calmly with reserve. All these
strongly support the claim that China wants to avoid confrontation, and through multi-
lateral dialogues prevent the world slipping back to Cold War confrontation. However, in
areas that touched on China’s core interests, China has been more assertive. In dealing with
maritime territorial disputes, China has intensified its war of words with other claimants,
rejected US intervention and insisted on bilateral talks to solve the disputes. The Daioyu
Islands (the Senkaku Islands according to Japan) is the source of constant conflict with Japan.Has China developed a new approach to achieve harmony?
After joining the UN in 1971, China initially took a stance of non-participation due to
skepticism on the interventional policy. However, it became more active since the 1980’s,
and began participating in peacekeeping missions in the 1990’s. From taking part as
observer in 1989 in Namibia, to providing engineering battalion in Cambodia in 1992,
sending medical troops to Congo in 2003, policing Haiti in 2004, sending engineering
battalion to Lebanon in 2006, China has taken on a bigger responsibility as expected from
a great power. Aside from the joint operations with the UN, China even earned the status
of a responsible actor when it refused to devalue the RMB during the Asia financial crisis
in 1997, which would have certainly sent Asia to another tailspin. However, there will
always be questions asked on whether China has really created a harmonious society.
Human rights abuse and lack of transparency in the rules of law have undermined China’s
claim. Its support to authoritarian regimes in Myanmar and Africa cannot arguably fit the
description of promoting a harmonious world.Table 1 Adult literacy rate in Africa
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Figure 2 Under-5 Mortality Rates (per 1,000 Live Birth). Source: UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality
Estimation 2011.
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Having established herself as the second largest economy in the world, behaving
responsibly during the Asian Financial Crisis by not devaluing the Renminbi, and taking a
reconciliatory stance in the bombing of its Belgrade embassy towards NATO and the US,
China could have accumulated enough goodwill to substantiate her claim of peaceful rise
and secure her position to lead the global South towards a development path that is not
orbiting around the West. However, China has been let down by its lack of disciplines
when investing abroad, often being accused of corruption, and squeezing out local job
market and production. Her increasingly assertiveness in territorial issues coupled with a
lack of transparency in military expansion have alerted her Asian neighbours to guard
against a rising dragon. Therefore, far from drawing the global South together, China has
casted herself away from them, Myanmar’s sudden leaning towards the US is a case in
point. Unless China reposition herself in the global South, she may one day rue about the
missed chances and feel increasingly contained by the West (Wong & Yue, 2014).
The embedded realism in Taoism and the Promise of Confucianism
China transited from Deng’s Taoist diplomacy to Jiang’s engagement policy and reached
Hu’s harmonious society. There are variations to the original doctrine of concealing
capacities and bidding time, however, Deng had also provided that when opportunity
arise, China should be “you suo zuo wei” (有所作為; proactive and make achievements).
To challenge the mainstream Western neo-liberalism as development model for under-
developed countries, China believes her own development model of social capitalism, or
capitalism with Chinese characteristics that relies on investment, trade and technology
instead of western aid, can be duplicated abroad (Brautigam 2009: 312). Consequently,
under Beijing Consensus, China is willing to provide financial assistance to under-
developed countries with no string attached. Beijing Consensus and Washington Consensus
went head-to-head in Angola during 2004. Frustrated by the stiff demands from the IMF to
introduce liberal reforms before providing much needed financial aid, the Angola
government turned to China in a $2 billion oil-backed loan. Aguinaldo Jaime, the defacto
Angola deputy prime minister summed up the sentiment of the country towards Western
aid, “If you say to a country, ‘We’ll reward you when things are perfectly O.K,’ the country
will say, ‘When things are perfectly O.K., we won’t need you anymore.’” j. Yet, the Beijing
Consensus is not without its critics, most noticeably from the US which claims China is
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ding off the recipient country’s natural resources. Also, the no-question-asked developmental
aid allows corrupted regimes to continue depriving their citizens from reaping the benefits
of development. Whereas neo-liberalism under Washington Consensus reinforces the de-
pendency between peripheral states and cores states, the aid-for-asset model under Beijing
Consensus creates another form of dependency, regime survival for the weak states.
Up to the turn of the millennium, China had gone on well with her Asian neighbours
and African friends. Whilst the West was quick to blame China on the way she quashed
the Tiananmen student protest and sanctions swiftly followed, her Asian neighbours
upheld the peaceful coexistence principle of non-interference and provided the diplomatic
space for the Beijing government. In reciprocal, when the Asian Financial Crisis hit
Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia, China did not follow the rest to
devalue its currency and held the RMB firm at the expense of potentially losing out on
exports. Outside the region, when the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was destroyed by
US-led NATO forces in 1999, China was refrained enough to prevent the incident from
escalating to a major confrontation with the US even though its sovereignty was clearly
being infringed k. The Hainan air-crash incident in 2001 was another case to demonstrate
Chinese leaders were eager to promote peace and harmony even though one of its fighter
pilots was killed trying to intercept a US surveillance plane l. Yet, why the West and
China’s neighbours are so worried about the rise of China, and why the aid provided by
China to under-developed countries were viewed with such skepticism?
To appreciate the concerns one must understand the strategic culture of China. Behind
the apparent peaceful Taoism that was embraced by Deng in his foreign policy is a hidden
realist agenda. Both Johnston (1995) and Wang (2011) have argued that history has shown
that China was an aggressor when her relative military power was stronger than her
neighbours. Indeed, Taoism concerns about the balance of power, the interconnected and
yet opposing relationship between yin (陰) and yang (陽), but balance of power is very
much a realist terminology. Whilst the West is fascinated by the wisdom of the Art of
War (孫子兵法) written by the great Chinese strategist Sun Tze, they are also informed of
the Chinese strategic culture of Wo Xin Chang Dan (臥薪嘗膽), which means enduring
self-imposed hardships in order to strengthen and prepare the resolve of a person to
realize his ambition. The history behind Wo Xin Chang Dan described a poetic justice
took place during the Spring Autumn period (770-476BC) when the State of Wu was at
war with the State of Yue. The King of the State of Wu was wounded and subsequently
died in battle. His son Fu Chai avenged the defeat of his father by conquering and captur-
ing his counterpart Guo Jian, and held him under imprisonment in Wu territory. In order
to humiliate and demoralize Guo Jian, Fu forced Guo to live in shameful conditions. Guo
endured the mental torture and years later secured his release back to the State of Yue
after swearing loyalty to Fu. Once back to his own state, Guo was very patient in hiding
his capability because the State of Wu was still far too strong for the State of Yue, but
secretly he trained an army. In order to remind himself of the humiliation as a hostage, he
sacrificed sleeping on a comfortable bed, but instead slept on a stack of firewood. Before
he had dinner and went to bed he tasted the bitterness of the gall-bladder that was hung
on top of his bed to remind himself of the painful experience as a captive, hence the term
Wo Xin Chang Dan. When opportunity arose, Gou launched attack on Fu, caught him by
surprise and wiped out the State of Wu in one stroke.
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observe the situations; secure footing; cope changes with confidence; conceal capacities
and buy time; skillfully keep a low profile; and avoid sticking head out, one cannot resist
but to draw parallels and ask the ultimate question: will China avenge on her humiliation
by the invasion of the Eight-Nation Alliance (八國聯軍), that consisted of Austria-
Hungry, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States?
If there is embedded realism in Taoism, how is it being manifested in the foreign policy
of Deng and his subsequent successors? One of the most ambiguous phrases in the policy
dictum of Deng is taoguang yanghui (韜光養晦), or to conceal capacities and bide time.
Why did China need to conceal capacities, and bide time to do what? A quick reminder
on how Deng dealt with the territorial dispute in the East China Sea with Japan and the
territorial dispute with her ASEAN neighbours in the South China Sea may illuminate the
traits of taoguang yanghui and hidden realism in the foreign policy of China.
During a visit to Japan in October 1978, Deng told the Japanese Prime Minister Takeo
Fukuda that the two countries should focus on promoting mutual interests instead of
arguing over Diaoyu Islands (Senkaku Islands to the Japanese) m. In May 1979, when
meeting with Suzuki Kenko, a member from the lower house of the Japanese Diet, Deng raised
for the first time the concept of “setting aside dispute and pursuing joint development” n.
Deng repeated the “setting aside dispute and pursuing joint development” concept on her
ASEAN neighbours. In June 1986, on the dispute over Nansha Islands, Deng said to visiting
Filipino Vice President Laurel, “we should leave aside the issue of the Nansha Islands for a
while. We should not let this issue stand in the way of China’s friendship with the
Philippines and with other countries.” o In April 1988, Deng told visiting Filipino President
Aquino, “in view of the friendly relations between our two countries, we can set aside this
issue for the time being and take the approach of pursuing joint development” p.
In the 70’s and 80’s, the reform in China was just underway. The economy was recovering
from the Cultural Revolution wreckage. China had neither the capacity nor the capability
to demand settlement on the disputed territories. Therefore, setting aside dispute
represented the most prudent approach. However, when the comprehensive power of
China rose to a level that led international relations commentators dubbed the G2 era, q
China became more assertive on her regional neighbours, resulting in escalating tensions
in the territorial disputes. Setting against a strategic culture of Wo Xin Chang Dan, the
Taoism diplomacy of taoguang yanghui could be seen in the light of hiding capacities so
that no one would worry about the threat of China rise until its comprehensive power
reached a critical mass, and bidding time to wait for opportunity to strike. The sub-prime
credit crisis in the US in 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis in Europe presented China
with the chance to raise the phoenix from the ashes. The arrogance of Chinese leaders led
the West and Asia to believe the China threat is clear and present.
Defending China’s policy in Africa, Li (2011) has highlighted the four notions of Chinese
cultural values of benevolence, forbearance, trustfulness and equality to argue that the non-
interference policy of China in Africa could produce a win-win situation for both countries.
Furthermore, Yan (2011) argued that the West has misunderstood China. While the
historical culture of China aspired to Daoism, China’s traditional worldview was
simultaneously operated under a system of Confucian values (Bell & Metz 2011).
Ontologically derived from Yijing (易經) (Cheng 2011b), Confucianism, advocated by
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of conduct that emphasize on respect. Under Confucianism, people should respect those
who are senior to them. As Tian (heaven) (天) was deemed to be above everything,
Chinese sovereigns, who were referred to as Tian-zi and claimed to be the Sons of Tian
(天子), therefore logically inherited unquestionable and indisputable political legitimacy
to govern (Bell & Metz, 2011). However, Confucianism also provides that the right to
power could be withdrawn from the Son of Tian if he failed to embrace and practice
Confucian values that consist of Humaneness (仁), Righteousness (義), Propriety (禮),
Knowledge (智) and Integrity (信). Under such scenario, there would be a change in
dynasty until a new Tian-zi emerged to uphold the moral values.
Extending beyond Chinese society, Confucianism justified and rationalized inequality in
the traditional Chinese tributary system under the Tian-xia (天下) worldview (Qin 2010).
Tian-xia means space under the heaven. Sharing the same Tian, the power of Tian-zi could
go beyond geographical boundaries to be exercised over tributary states, whose people
should aspire to the Chinese culture underpinned by Confucian values. The external reach
of Tian-zi was structured under three Chinese philosophical concepts of holism, Datong
(大同) and order (Qin 2010: 41–42). These concepts underline the key fundamental
differences between Chinese Confucianism worldview and Western realism traditions.
Holism means there should be no separation between “I” and “we”, or “self” and “other”.
It has two dimensions: the temporal dimension that structures like the relationship
between great-grandfather with the great-grandson, and the spatial dimension views like
at the center of a ripple with concentric rings spreading out. Under this holism worldview,
there is nothing opposite. This concept is fundamentally different from Western realist’s
interpretation of the world that conflicts between states are inevitable.
Datong, meaning great harmony, refers to the trinity where human and nature, ideal
and reality, moral and material, meet as a harmonious whole (Qin 2010: 42). In
contrast with realism which assumes the world is anarchic, under Datong, a harmonious
world was not only natural but inevitable. In a Confucian tributary system, order was
different from the Hobbesian jungle where men were equal but because of survival had to
be hostile to each other, nor was it the same as in a Lockean society where people were
equal but they had to be competitive to stay ahead of one another, and it was not a
Kantian culture in which people were equal and friendly to each other.
The order under a Confucian tributary system was like the relationship between father
and son, unequal but benign out of respect (Qin 2010: 42). Indeed, a Confucian world
order is quite different from the landscape painted by Western international relations
theories of realism, liberalism and constructivism (Yue 2014). Whereas realism leads to
hegemony, liberalism causes interdependency, and constructivism encourages regionalism,
Confucianism promotes a harmonious world under an asymmetrical system crafted out of
mutual respect (Table 2). Precisely because of these different perspectives which are deeply
rooted in Chinese culture, Confucianism could potentially illuminate an alternative
approach towards south-south cooperation that is free from dominance and dependency.Operational mechanism of Confucianism in South-South Cooperation
In Western society, harmony is regulated by the rule of law. It is an error-control feedback
system, if a person breaks the law, he will be sent to the court for judgement and
Table 2 Comparing Confucianism with realism, liberalism and constructivism
Confucianism Realism Liberalism Constructivism
Level of
analysis
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control internal moral compass. Whilst Confucianism is a very broad concept, for the
purpose of understanding its role in China’s foreign relations policy, the paper loosely uses
Confucianism to describe the moral universe of the self which is based on goodness. This
approach is consistent with other writings which deal with China’s external policies (Li,
2011; Cheng, 2011a). Confucius installed Propriety (li; 禮) as the basis to achieve
harmony, and therefore Propriety is the foundation for political rule (Cheng 2011b). In
the Analects (Lunyu《論語》), which contains the main teachings of Confucius, it said:
“Guided by dictates of political authority, and regulated by punishment, people can get
by without violating the law but have no sense of shame; guided by virtue, and regulated
by li, people will have sense of shame and a standard of personal development” (Analects
(Lunyu《論語》2:3, in Cheng 2011b: 12).
Propriety (li; 禮) is underpinned by Humaneness (Ren; 仁). The Chinese character of
Ren is symbolically made up of two components: humanity and the togetherness of two
human beings (Cheng 2011b: 12). To be considered Ren, a person must place himself into
the position of others so that he can empathize and sympathize the others before taking
any action. Ren is therefore an internal feeling generated from the inner consciousness of
a person (Cheng 2011b: 16).
If Ren is the internal moral control, then Righteousness (yi; 義), represents “the proper
share one should receive from a just distribution of rights and benefits, duties, and
responsibilities” (Cheng 2011b: 16). Thus, Righteousness is the external expression of
morality. Together with Propriety (li; 禮) and Humaneness (Ren; 仁), the three virtues
combined to produce Knowledge (zhi;智). Knowledge here does not simply mean knowing
things epistemologically, but the knowledge of doing the rights thing morally, guided by
Propriety (li;禮), Righteousness (yi;義), and Humaneness (Ren;仁). Thus “zhi is knowledge
of ends and the ability to discern the means to given ends” (Cheng 2011b: 17). With
Knowledge comes Integrity (xin;信), or trust. Trust is not a given virtue, it has been gained
from a combination of subjective feeling and objective observation of trustworthiness. In
Confucian ethics, trust is generated from inside a person through Propriety (li; 禮),
Righteousness (yi;義), Humaneness (Ren;仁), and Knowledge (zhi;智), trust in oneself will
induce trust from others, thus producing Harmony (he; 和), or a harmonious world.
Therefore, according to Confucius, a ruler must establish trust, for “there is no way to estab-
lish oneself without trust from people” (Lunyu 《論語》12:7, in Cheng 2011b: 27). To be
sure, according to Confucius, harmony is achieved from internal self. This is the
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punishment (Yue 2014) (Figure 3).
Why has Confucianism failed to deliver its potential as a non-Western international
relations theory? According to Cheng (2011a: 1), “after the May 4th Movement of 1919
(Wusi Yundong 五四運動), Confucianism lost much of its moral appeal and political
authority and entered into a kind of limbo”. Post-Tiananmen Chinese leadership justified
their continuous grab on power by sustaining the economic miracle. To push for growth,
the leadership have turned blind eyes on corruption, rules of law and human rights, effect-
ively abandoning all Confucian values. Therefore, aid provided under the Beijing Consen-
sus is naturally being treated with suspicions (Alden 2007; Davies 2007; Sautman 2007;
Taylor 2006). Ramos (2004), who coined the term Beijing Consensus, suggested that
China’s rise in economic power had allowed her to play an important role in helping other
developing countries to develop. In 2009 alone, China provided RMB250 billion in aid, of
which 41% was in grant, 30% in interest-free loans, and 29% in concessional loans (Infor-
mation of the State Council and the People’s Republic of China 2011). China’s uncondi-
tional aid to under-developed states in Africa has prompted the former US Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton to describe it as creeping “new colonialism” during her three-nation
tour of the African continent in June 2011. Clinton pointed out “it is easy to come in, take
out natural resources, pay off leaders and leave, and when you leave, you don’t leave much
behind for the people who are there. We don’t want to see a new colonialism in Africa” r.
China has risen rapidly in the last three decades, allowing the country to be more influen-
tial in global affairs, but China has also become more assertive in regional conflicts as can
be seen in her attitudes towards the South China Sea territorial dispute. China’s economic
and military strengths have alarmed her neighbours, leading to fears that the China rise can-
not be peaceful. When hard power is seen to be threatening, China desperately needs to
project her soft power to balance her international image. Soft power means co-operating
with people in getting what you want, not by coercion, and it is not the same as influence
or persuasion, but possesses the ability to attract and leads to acquiescence (Nye 2004: 5–6).
The question of whether Confucianism has a postmodern role in guiding state behavior
thus becomes more urgent. Echoing Cheng’s (2011a: 1) view, reviving Confucianism as a
moral-political philosophy and by incorporating the moral values into China’s foreign policy
has the potential to provide an alternative to Western-styled international relations.
Policy implication: beyond dependency – a new Bandung initiative and its critiques
This paper posits that the failure of the 1955 Bandung Conference was boiled down to
the absence of a dominant actor in the global south. Therefore, when set within a Cold
War polarized context, the global south were caught between the struggles of great power
rivalries, thus south-south cooperation never got off the ground. However, the rise in the
comprehensive power of China may present another chance for a new Bandung initiative.Figure 3 Conceptual framework of the key tenants of Confucianism (Cheng, 2011b: 18).
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south cooperation bandwagon is likely to fall into the same trap as realists have done
to justify domination based on a hegemonic stability discourse s. However, this is
precisely where decolonization of thoughts may help to contribute to a new
international relations paradigm that is epistemologically different from the Western
traditions of realism, liberalism and constructivism. Controversially, relationship based
on Confucianism is not based on equal footing. Confucianism postulates an asymmetrical
relationship built on respect, like a son towards his father; a student towards his teacher.
Similar to that of the old Chinese tributary system, China can be potentially installed at
the center of a south-south plenary assembly. China, of course, does not possess the
automatic right to lead the cause, its leadership must fully embrace the Confucian values,
through propriety, righteousness and humaneness to build knowledge, integrity, and
ultimately, achieving harmony. During this process, there will be mistakes made, but this
merely serves to underline the importance of integrity generated from practicing
propriety, righteousness and humaneness.
Whilst this paper is aware that Confucianism is not a static concept (Ng and Chow,
1999; Sole-Farras, 2014; Tu, 1994), the changing narratives and boundaries should not
affect the fundamental philosophical meanings that consist of goodness within the self.
Therefore, this paper adopts the views of Zhang (1980–81) and Lauridsen (1988) that
Confucianism has “an abstract meaning making them forever relevant, besides the
concrete meaning limited by historical circumstances” (Lauridsen, 1988: 27).
Another source of criticism is likely to come from non-Chinese cultural backgrounds,
the moral ethics that are advocated by Confucianism may not be applicable to other
cultures. Confucianism is not a religion. It does need to convince others to believe in its
preaching or values. Confucianism is a moral-political philosophy that set examples for
others to follow (Cheng, 2011a). Different from the End of History claim of Fukuyama
(1992) and the Clash of Civilisations postulation of Huntington (1997), Confucianism
promotes holism to eliminate the “I” and “we” in a world that is separated by ideology
and civilization. Therefore, the question of “why do they hate us” would never arise in a
Confucian discourse.Conclusion
It is never the intention of this paper to claim China has been misunderstood in terms of
its foreign policy projection under Beijing Consensus, nor to deny the negative impacts
on local societies when resource-led diplomacy is intertwined with rogue regimes, corrup-
tions and human displacements. Quite the contrary, this paper argues that it is because of
the failure of China in promoting Confucian values that resulted in backlashes from local
communities, but this shortfall should not deny the potential offered by Confucianism as
a gravitational pull to galvanise south-south cooperation in a decolonial push away from
Western hegemony.
Both Johnston and Wang posit that China would go on offensive in a realist domain.
This may be true if we accept the global order is anarchic, and it was certainly the case in
the pre-modernity periods when the authors based their investigations. However, in an
increasingly globalised world where transnational organisations can play the role to
“articulate[ing] problems and conflicts and solve[ing] them” (Galtung, 1980: 425), global
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field, it can surface on different images, such as trade (trade war), or cultural influence
(soft power), Therefore, the global order that we are in today is neither anarchic nor
pacific, hence reviving the Confucian moral values may help to navigate in this new
uncharted territory.
During the Boao Forum for Asia in 2013, Chinese Premier Xi Jinping outlined a vision
for cooperation based on sustainable development, stability against traditional and non-
traditional threats, and balancing the interests of all parties t. While this may set the
terrain for cooperation both within and beyond Asia, a new Bandung initiative requires a
much more solid operational framework that should be delinked from the north–south
model. Instead, the narrative of a new Bandung initiative on south-south cooperation
should go beyond the dependency on the developed economies. China has amassed a
staggering US$3.7 trillion in foreign reserves after twenty years of economic expansion,
more than triple the second largest reserve country, Japan (US$1.2 trillion). The most
important and daunting task for China is how to recycle the surplus to other parts of the
global south without attracting the labels of neo-colonialism or creating dependency as it
has suffered in the past under the Beijing Consensus. Confucianism, as a self-critique to
guide own behaviours, offers the potential of a moral compass to navigate towards a new
course for south-south cooperation. How to unleash this potential requires coding of
Confucian practice, from there we can ascertain where China has fallen short, and where
she can improve in order to repair her tainted image. However, coding Confucian practice
is beyond the scope of this paper and therefore, it becomes the suggestion of this paper
for further research.
The rise of China should neither be seen as a challenge to the US hegemony, nor a
disruption to existing global system. Rather, it should be received as a counter-balancing
force that offers an alternative development path for developing and under-developed
countries that is free from the curse of dependency. There are evidences that China’s
resource-led investment and aid policies in Africa have improved the economic conditions
of those countries. However, China should also be aware that her business ethics have
raised concerns in the international community and even encountered rejections in some
recipient countries. Therefore, China should promote her soft power through re-
embracing Confucian values, and to lead the global south towards genuine development
that is free from dependency.Endnotes
aGeorge Bush’s address to the joint session of Congress and the nation, September 20, 2001.
The Washington Post: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/
transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html
bThe Final Communique of the Asian-African conference of Bandung (24 April 1955).
http://franke.uchicago.edu/Final_Communique_Bandung_1955.pdf
cWorld Bank statistics
dInternational Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Military Balance Report 2014.
https://www.iiss.org/en/publications/military-s-balance
eDuring her five-day tour of Africa in June 2011, the then US secretary Hilary Clinton
said the world’s second largest economy (China) was displaying traits of “neo-colonialism”
Yue Bandung: Journal of the Global South  (2015) 2:4 Page 16 of 17in Africa, and “we saw that during colonial times, it is easy to come in, take out natural
resources, pay off leaders and leave.” (Bloomberg News, June 11, 2011, “Clinton chastises
China on Internet, African New ‘Colonialism’”. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
06-11/clinton-chastises-china-on-internet-african-new-colonialism-.html




jNew York Times, November 19, 2006, “China’s African Adventure”. http://www.
nytimes.com/2006/11/19/magazine/19china.html?pagewanted=print&_r=0
kThe Guardian, 17 October 1999, “Nato bombed Chinese deliberately”. http://www.
theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/17/balkans
lCRS Report for Congress, “China-US aircraft collision incident of April 2001: Assess-
ments and Policy Implications”. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30946.pdf
mMinistry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Set aside dispute and





qSee E. Economy and A. Segal, “The G2 Mirage: Why the United States and China
are not ready to upgrade ties”, in Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009; CNN, 2 April 2009,
“US-China relations in focus at ‘G2’ summit”. http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/
europe/04/01/g20.china.us/
rBloomberg, 12 June 2011. “Clinton Chastises China on Internet, African ‘New Colonialism’”.
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-06-11/clinton-chastises-china-on-internet-
african-new-colonialism-.html
sHegemonic Stability Theory proposers such as Kindleberger (1973), Gilpin (1987) and
Modelski (1987) have argued that the world is a safer place with less conflicts if there is a
hegemonic power to dictate order and set the rules.
tOpening speech by Xi Jinping at the Boao Forum. http://www.china.org.cn/business/
Boao_Forum_2013/2013-04/10/content_28501562.htm
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